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Abstract 
Many countries fix their exchange rate in order to bring financial stability. Usually, 
inflation declines and output expands but contractual agreements retain their short time 
frame, investment is sluggish, and economic growth slows down a few years later. This 
outcome is often attributed to persistent doubts on the part of agents in the commitment 
and ability of the government to maintain the peg. Yet direct evidence for credibility is 
difficult to obtain. Unique survey data from Bulgaria reveal that expectations of 
devaluation were indeed very much present three, four, and five years after that country 
achieved financial stability under a currency board regime.   
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Tenuous Financial Stability  
1.        Introduction 
Stabilization in developing countries follows a typical pattern. After a period of 
high inflation and rapid depreciation, the exchange rate is fixed, public finances are 
tightened, and measures are taken to increase confidence in the banking system. Inflation 
usually declines to lower levels and a consumption boom generates economic expansion 
in the initial years. Investment, however, remains low, as agents seem reluctant to make 
long-term commitments. An economic slowdown a few years later raises doubts about 
the sustainability of the fixed exchange rate and some negative shock often proves 
sufficient to bring devaluation.
1  
In the literature, the negative outcome is often explained by persistent doubts in 
the governments’ commitment and ability to maintain the peg. There are several factors 
that may contribute to that. First, expectations may adjust slowly and the memory of the 
dramatic experience that led to the stabilization program may linger for a long time. 
Second, it is typical that financial instability is a chronic problem. Since agents have 
experienced several failed stabilization efforts in the past, it may take a long time to 
convince them that the current effort will have a different outcome. Third, negative 
economic developments may raise new concerns about the sustainability of a 
stabilization regime. For example, with high unemployment, the political pressure to 
devalue the currency, to increase government spending or to decrease taxes could be 
substantial.    
All of those contribute to what Calvo (1986) refers to as expectations of 
“temporary stabilization,” expectations that usually are correct in countries with chronic 
financial problems. It fact, an analytical framework incorporating such expectations is 
quite successful in accounting for much of the stylized facts of stabilization programs.
2 
As convincing as the credibility argument is, credibility is difficult to observe 
empirically when markets are not well developed and the usual measure of credibility -- 
the spread between domestic and international interest rates -- may reflect factors other 
                                                 
1 For a summary of the stylized facts of inflation stabilization see Calvo and Vegh (1994) and Bruno 
(1993). 
2 This framework has been further developed by Calvo and Drazen (1998), Mendoza and Uribe (1999) 
among others. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 540 
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than expectations of devaluation. For example, using data from Argentina, Mexico and 
Israel in the 1980’s Kaminsky and Leiderman (1998) show that liquidity tightening 
which is typical at the time of stabilization may be an additional factor for high interest 
rates in those countries. Brock and Rojas Suarez (2000) and Catao (1998) present 
evidence that intermediation spreads in Latin America in the 1990’s can be largely 
explained by institutional characteristics of their banking system such as high operation 
costs, high credit risk, backlogs of non-performing loans, and market segmentation 
between domestic and foreign currency borrowers. These problems are not uncommon in 
other developing countries. Similarly, inflation and short-term interest rates do decline in 
some countries, which may be interpreted as full credibility although longer-term, less 
visible, concerns may still persist.  
Because of those factors, there is very little we know about the formation of 
expectations during stabilization regimes. Most research has focused either on the initial 
adjustment of expectations during disinflation or on expectations before a crisis. At those 
episodes, expectations are reasonably well revealed by dramatic movements in economic 
variables such as interest rates, capital flows, and exchange rates. What about the tranquil 
period after disinflation and well before a crisis? If longer-term credibility remains low, it 
may translate into low investment and slow growth and thus contribute to the ultimate 
demise of the stabilization program. Credibility in a period of apparent financial stability 
is the subject of this paper. The analysis is aided by unique survey data from Bulgaria. 
A currency board introduced in Bulgaria in 1997 delivered rapid disinflation 
followed by stable prices. Along with the currency board, the government embarked on a 
wide-scale economic restructuring, shifting much of the GDP into the private sector. The 
environment of the first years with a currency board was one of low inflation, large 
restructuring, rising unemployment, and low but rising investment. Three national 
surveys were conducted in 2000, 2001, and 2002, asking a representative sample of 
Bulgarians about the likelihood of devaluation.   
Despite several years of financial stability, about a quarter of all agents 
persistently believed that the currency board would collapse and devaluation would occur 
in the next year. Only about a fifth of all agents believed that this is a probability zero 
event. Credibility is strongly influenced by perceived economic performance. Agents William Davidson Institute Working Paper 540 
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who believed that the currency board contributed to the high level of unemployment had 
heightened expectations of devaluation.  
Political factors also played an important role. The 2001 national elections were 
associated with increased short-term concerns about the currency board although not as 
much as standard political economy models would predict. In terms of external 
influences, the Argentine currency board crisis did not create a substantial increase in 
expected devaluation in Bulgaria, although it did generate greater uncertainty, as 
indicated by larger percentages of respondents giving no answer.  
The surveys from Bulgaria support the results of Schmukler and Serven (2001) 
using (short-term, up to one year) interest rate data from Argentina and Hong Kong, two 
countries with currency boards (Argentina until 2002). The differential between similar 
assets denominated in local and foreign currency had been consistently positive since the 
inception of those currency boards, particularly in Argentina.       
This is a case study of Bulgaria and extra caution must be taken to place the 
results into context. We provide such background in the next section. We then proceed to 
present the data and discuss the various influences on credibility in sections 3 and 4. In 
section 5 we consider possible linkages between incomplete credibility and economic 
performance. We conclude with final remarks in section 6.   
 
2.  The Bulgarian currency board 
Bulgaria introduced a currency board on July 1
st 1997 after a severe financial 
crisis late in 1996 and in the first half of 1997 when price increases touched 
hyperinflation levels, the currency devalued sharply, and several banks failed. The crisis 
led to a large-scale civil unrest and early parliamentary elections.
3 Introducing the 
currency board, and fixing the domestic currency unit (lev) to the German mark, was one 
of the first policies of the new government.  
The financial crisis that led to the introduction of the currency board was the third 
high inflation episode since transition began. The price liberalization in 1991 and the 
correction of an overvalued exchange rate in 1994 led to sharp increases in prices and 
                                                 
3  For a discussion of the crises that lead to the introduction of the currency board in Bulgaria, see 
Balyozov (1999), Dobrinsky (2000), and Gulde (1999).  William Davidson Institute Working Paper 540 
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rapid devaluations. The periods between crises were characterized by relative financial 
stability. In other words, agents’ experience over the last ten years was one of repeated 
failures to keep prices and the exchange rate stable. The more distant history, which 
encompasses almost five decades of controlled economy, however, is characterized by 
stable prices. 
A currency board is a fixed exchange rate regime that operates like a gold 
standard. The authorities forego discretionary control over the money supply and replace 
it with an automatic mechanism that links money supply changes to the balance of 
payments. The amount of foreign exchange reserves that the currency board stands ready 
to exchange for domestic money is sufficient to cover the monetary base.
 The currency 
board has no responsibilities to react to unemployment, to finance the budget or to 
provide liquidity to commercial banks.
4 The currency board contributes to the credibility 
of the fixed exchange rate by removing the possibility for monetizing budget deficits and 
thus forcing the government to take necessary fiscal adjustments. The associated cost is 
the loss of discretionary monetary policy.  
As Table 1 shows, with the introduction of the currency board inflation declined 
very rapidly into single digits. Aside from occasional spikes and short periods of 
deflation, inflation has remained relatively low and stable since 1997.
5   
The currency board, like any other monetary regime, can be removed if the 
perceived benefits of such a move outweigh the potential political and economic costs. 
Those benefits are usually associated with 1) the reactivation of monetary and exchange 
rate policy, i.e. the government may choose to remove the currency board in order to 
stimulate economic activity; and 2) reducing the real value of government debt by money 
creation.  
 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
4 Schwartz (1993), Williamson (1995), Kopcke (1999), Ghosh, Gulde, and Wolf (1998), and Schmukler 
and Serven (2001) discuss the operation and history of currency boards.  
5 For a study of the currency board and macroeconomic developments in Bulgaria since 1997, see Gulde 
(1999), Nenovsky and Hristov (2000), and Miller (1999). William Davidson Institute Working Paper 540 
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2.1  Origins of high inflation and sustainable long-run adjustments 
As many other economies in the former Eastern bloc, Bulgaria was plagued by 
large spending needs and a significant drop in revenues after the start of transition in 
1989. Loss-making state-owned enterprises operated on soft budget constraints, which 
led to a continued drain on tax money while the tax base was shrinking and tax evasion 
widespread. Stop-and-go privatization policies with frequently changing governments 
prolonged this state of affairs by failing to force enterprise restructuring or liquidation.
6  
Not surprisingly a policy of tight money and financial stability was not 
maintained. As Table 1 shows, until the introduction of the currency board, the 
government ran large budget deficits, which were generally monetized. In the year when 
the crisis erupted, the budget deficit escalated to 10.4 percent of GDP. The hyperinflation 
episode early in 1997 was fueled by a credit from the Bulgarian central bank to the 
government in December 1996, which equaled 6 percent of GDP (Dobrinsky, 2000). 
Sustained financial stability after 1997 required that those subsidies be reduced 
dramatically. The government that introduced the currency board embarked on such 
reforms. 
With accelerated privatization between 1997 and 2001, the percentage of 
Bulgaria’s GDP produced in the private sector rose from 45 percent in 1996 to 70 percent 
in 2001, which is well in line with the private sector shares in advanced transition 
countries (EBRD, 2001). Direct and implicit subsidies to enterprises were drastically cut 
(Braxi, Shatalov, and Zlaoui, 2001). Almost all banks, which until 1997 were used to 
direct subsidized credit to public enterprises, were privatized. Additional revenues came 
from improving tax collection and accelerated privatization, which generated 
privatization receipts (Table 1). Most of the fiscal adjustment however was achieved as a 
result of the hyperinflation episode, which had wiped out much of the domestic debt of 
                                                 
6 To some extent, those policy decisions can be considered endogenous to Bulgaria’s initial conditions in 
the transition process. Unlike other transition countries, Bulgaria had not implemented almost any market 
reforms until the very end of communism in 1989. A large part of its trade was with the former Soviet 
Union and much of the industry operated on old technologies dependent on cheap Soviet energy. Thus, 
reorientation of the economy required massive enterprise restructuring and liquidations, and therefore 
substantial layoffs. Naturally, the opposition to such policies was strong and reforms were delayed. 
Analyzing the 1996-97 crisis, Dobrinsky (2000, p. 600) writes: “owing to the endogeneity of political-
economic interactions, it is not possible ex post to either assert or to deny that the crisis was unavoidable or 
that it was mostly policy provoked, or that there were feasible, crisis-free transition paths.” William Davidson Institute Working Paper 540 
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the government.
 In 1996, interest payments on domestic debt had reached 17 percent of 
GDP. Two years later, in 1998, they were 1.2 percent. With those measures, the short-
term budget situation was stable.  
Bulgaria inherited from communism the largest foreign debt burden of any 
Central and Eastern European economy, which in 2000 stood at 86 percent of GDP 
(Svejnar, 2002). According to Brixi, Shatalov, and Zlaoui (2001, p. 13) foreign debt 
service is projected at about 10 percent of GDP on an annual basis or at 21-22% of 
exports, which is “uncomfortably close to the empirical crisis threshold of 25 percent”. 
Much of the debt is denominated in dollars at a floating interest rate and thus presents 
interest and exchange rate risks. The large debt burden leaves little room for discretionary 
spending.  
In addition to continued large foreign debt service the long-term presents other 
fiscal problems. Programs such as social security and medical care are under strain, as the 
number of employed contributors to these state funds is roughly equal to the number of 
beneficiaries. Education and infrastructure programs are under-funded while projected 
outlays for compliance with EU environmental standards will be substantial. By 2001 
most of the large-scale privatization was completed, which implied declining 
privatization receipts in the near future. According to the Bulgarian Privatization Agency, 
79.8 percent of assets destined for privatizations will be sold off by the end of 2002.
7 
Thus longer-term fiscal concerns persisted, as the government’s ability to react to 
potential negative shocks, to increase public investment or to experiment with tax reform 
did not appear to improve. The obvious solution to those problems is economic growth.
8   
Although growth was faster after the currency board was introduced, by 2001 it 
was not sufficient to reverse the output decline in 1996-97. In 2001 GDP was still at 70 
percent of 1989 GDP, the last year before transition (Svejnar 2002). A 2001 IMF report 
concluded that: “Despite the remarkable turnaround since 1997, conditions for self-
sustained growth appear not fully to be in place. Aggregate demand growth in recent 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
7 Data on privatization for Bulgaria is available at www.priv.government.bg.   
8 EBRD (1995) estimates that in 1995, the effective enterprise tax rates in Bulgaria averaged an astounding 
83 percent close only to Ukraine’s in Central and Eastern Europe. Given that government size has 
remained roughly similar, the tax burdens has probably not declined significantly.   William Davidson Institute Working Paper 540 
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years has been driven primarily by the rebound from the 1996-97 crisis”.
9 By 2001 
unemployment had increased to 17.3 percent (Table 1) while real incomes had stagnated. 
 
2.2  The currency board policies and economic performance. 
As our surveys asked agents whether the currency board contributed to 
unemployment, it is important to discuss briefly the effect of the stabilization policies on 
economic performance. Austerity policies are never popular. Yet, the preponderance of 
evidence from transition economies (e.g. Wyplosz, 2000, Svejnar, 2002, and de Melo et 
al., 1997), strongly suggests that although not a sufficient condition, financial stability is 
a necessary condition for growth. Few policymakers or academics advocate policies that 
are certain to lead to high inflation. Therefore, the question is not whether low inflation is 
desirable but whether the policies used to achieve it are not an overkill and 
counterproductive. Many highly visible researchers (e.g. Stiglitz, 1998) have criticized 
the drastic fiscal adjustments associated with IMF stabilization policies.  
The reasons advanced to explain sluggish growth and even output declines in 
transition economies are a mixture of initial conditions and policy choices. Privatization 
and market disorganization (Blanchard and Kremer, 1997), sectoral shifts in the presence 
of labor market imperfections (Atkeson and Kahoe, 1996), or the dissolution of old 
trading arrangements may all lead to output decline. Transition economies, including 
Bulgaria, also suffer from a number of political and institutional problems, which make 
the creation and expansion of enterprises difficult. In Bulgaria, exports were depressed by 
the crisis in Russia in 1998 and the war in neighboring Yugoslavia, which disrupted trade 
routes to Western European markets.  
Is the elimination of discretionary policy under the Bulgarian currency board an 
overkill?  In our opinion, the answer is no. From the earlier discussion it is clear that the 
scope for discretionary fiscal policy is severely limited by the present fiscal situation 
rather than by a preoccupation with fiscal discipline under the currency board.
10 
                                                 
9 International Monetary Fund (2001), page 5. 
10 Brixi, Shatalov, and Zlaoui (2001, p. 11) show that “government expenditures are dominated by social 
protection programs, debt service, and wages” and that leaves only “7 percent of GDP in total for defense 
and capital expenditure.” They conclude that the “government faces a constraint on both the revenue and 
the expenditure side.” William Davidson Institute Working Paper 540 
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Expansionary fiscal policy would likely lead to unsustainable growth in government debt. 
With a history of high inflation a monetary expansion would probably lead to a sharp 
decline in money demand and devaluation rather than an increase in credit activity. 
Devaluation for competitive purposes would likely have a similar effect on money 
demand. In other words, in practical terms the scope for expansionary fiscal policy is 
very limited and there is little that the government would be able to do if the monetary 
regime allowed more discretion. As the next sections reveal, however, a non-trivial part 
of the population does not share our views on this issue.   
Finally, in addition to persistent fiscal risks and sluggish growth, the deteriorating 
external balances of the country presented additional sources of concern. Export growth 
was slow and current account deficits grew to 6.7 and 6.3 percent of GDP in 2000 and 
2001. Most of that was financed by foreign direct investment inflows.
11 Those inflows 
however are tightly linked to privatization, which, as we pointed out earlier, was close to 
completion.  
Officially, a change in the monetary regime is considered a possibility only after 
joining the European Union and the euro zone, which is not expected to occur any time 
soon. A proposal sometimes floated in the public domain is to adopt the euro unilaterally 
even before joining the euro zone. That option however is being dismissed as 
unnecessary by the government partly because of their perception that the currency board 
has created full credibility in the domestic currency. The survey results reported next 
reveal the extent to which that perception is correct.   
 
3.  Survey data.   
We use data from three surveys of households, which were conducted by a 
national polling organization in Bulgaria in August 2000, October 2001, and June 2002. 
The sample of 1000 respondents and its demographic structure are representative of the 
population. The surveys were conducted by personal interviews. Agents answered several 
questions. 
                                                 
11 Dobrinsky (2001) argues that the deterioration of the current account balance is partially explained by 
wage rigidities and loss of competitiveness under the fixed exchange rate.   William Davidson Institute Working Paper 540 
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First, the surveys asked respondents what was the likelihood that the currency 
board would collapse and that there will be a sharp devaluation of the local currency in 
the next (6 months/12 months/5 years)? They could choose an answer ranging from “very 
big” to “none” (zero probability of devaluation) or choose to provide no answer.   
Second, the surveys asked whether respondents strongly agreed, agreed, 
disagreed, or strongly disagreed with the statement that the currency board contributed to 
high unemployment.  
Third, the 2000 survey asked about the extent to which an agent follows 
economic news and developments. They could answer that they do not follow such 
information or that they do because of a general interest or because their job requires it. 
Fourth, agents provided information about their gender, education level, age, and 
voting behavior. The surveys also asked about income but many agents chose not to 
report that.
12  
The timing of the surveys is of significant importance. The 2000 survey was 
conducted several months before national elections and the 2001 survey several months 
after the elections. Comparison of expectations from those two surveys highlights the 
effect of uncertainty associated with the elections. The 2002 survey was done a few 
months after the collapse of the Argentine currency board. Expectations at that time, in 
combination with expectations from the 2001 survey before the collapse, can be used to 
observe the effects of that event on the credibility of the currency board in Bulgaria.  
We proceed as follows. In the next section, we present responses about the 
likelihood of devaluation from the three surveys, and we assess the effect of elections and 
the Argentine crisis. Then, we use the 2000 survey to examine cross-sectional differences 
in expectations using the additional questions described above.  
 
 
4.   Expected Devaluation  
Table 2 shows respondents’ expectations of devaluation from the three surveys. It 
is immediately clear that the currency board is not fully credible. In 2000, a substantial 
                                                 
12 The 2000 also included several questions about agents’ attitudes toward economic policies in general. 
They were asked about their preferences over the distribution of state and private sector involvement in the William Davidson Institute Working Paper 540 
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part of the respondents, 31.3 percent believed that the currency board is likely or very 
likely to collapse in the next six months. This percentage is higher, 36.4 percent for 12 
months and 39.0 percent for 5 years. There was a related drop in certainty about the 
sustainability of the currency board. The percent of those who were certain that the 
currency board would be maintained was 20.6 for 6 months, 15.3 for 12 months, and 12.9 
for 5 years.  
 
4.1  Political uncertainty preceding the 2001 national elections. 
Much has been written about political dynamics and the sustainability of reform 
programs in transition economies (e.g. Hellman, 1998, Aslund, 2002, Roland, 2002). The 
traditional view holds that reform policies (in the case of Bulgaria: hardening budget 
constraints under the currency board, reduced government spending, enterprise 
privatization and liquidation, all of which lead to higher short term unemployment) are 
challenged at the ballot box by concentrated groups of losers from the reform process 
(e.g., the unemployed). If the backlash is sufficiently strong, the policy may be reversed.  
On the surface, the sweeping loss in the June 2001 national elections of the 
government that introduced the currency board looks exactly like a backlash against 
painful reforms. The new government however continued the policies of the previous 
government with a strong commitment to the currency board. One source of uncertainty 
in late 2000 was the lack of clarity about who would challenge the current government 
even though it had lost public support. The movement that won was organized only a few 
months before the elections. This political vacuum however could have catapulted 
someone else to power.
13 In addition, as Aslund (2002, p. 385) points out, a policy 
reversal would not have been an isolated event in the transition history of Bulgaria as 
Bulgaria illustrates the “danger of patently inconsistent policies and erratic policy 
reversals.” 
From Table 2, short-run credibility improved substantially following the 
elections. The percent of agent who thought that the probability of devaluation was big or 
                                                                                                                                                 
economy. Many sided with a fairly strong role for the state. Summary tables are available upon request.   
13 These elections attracted much international interest as the winning movement was organized by the son 
of the last tzar of Bulgaria before communism who returned to Bulgaria just a few months before the 
elections.  William Davidson Institute Working Paper 540 
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very big in the next one year decreased from 36.4 percent in 2000 to 19.1 percent in 
2001. Long-term credibility however improved by somewhat less. The percent of agents 
who thought that the probability of devaluation was big or very big in the next five years 
declined from 39 percent in 2000 to 29.7 percent in 2001.  
 
4.2  The Argentine crisis. 
The Argentine currency crisis challenged a view that had prevailed in policy 
circles after a series of crises in Latin America, South East Asia, and Russia in the 
1990’s. Since the Argentine and the Hong Kong currency board regimes seemed to hold 
well despite the pressure, the view maintained that countries should adopt either a 
floating exchange rate regime or a “hard” peg, i.e. a currency board or official 
dollarization. As the crisis in Argentina proved however, hard pegs are not immune to 
devaluations. Thus, the crisis raised doubts in the very concept that currency boards are 
nearly impossible to remove and may have contributed to greater expectations of 
devaluation in Bulgaria. At the same time, however, although the final analysis of what 
happened in Argentina is not yet complete it seems that the crisis merely reminded 
everyone that long-term financial stabilization is a function of sound policies, namely 
prudent fiscal policy. In this sense, it did not reveal much new information about 
stabilization efforts and failure relevant to the Bulgarian context.
14 The crisis received 
substantial coverage in the media.      
Table 2 reports expected devaluation in June 2002, a few months after the 
collapse of the Argentine currency board. One notable change in expectations compared 
to expectations in October 2001 before the crisis, is the increase in the proportion of 
agents who declined to formulate a forecast on the currency board. The percent of those 
agents increased from around 2-5 percent in 2000 and 2001 to around 15 percent in 2002. 
That increase comes primarily at the expense of the percent of agents who believe that 
the probability of devaluation was very small. It appears that the level of uncertainty has 
increased.  
 
                                                 
14 The Argentine crisis has little direct economic impact on Bulgaria’s economy, as trade and investment 
flows are negligible.   William Davidson Institute Working Paper 540 
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4.3   Cross sectional differences.  
Table 3 shows the distribution of expected devaluation in 2000 for the overall 
sample and for sub samples defined with the use of the survey questions. Agents who 
believed the probability of devaluation over the next year was big or very big as well as 
those who believed that the probability of devaluation was small or very small were 
combined. Thus, in the overall sample, 36.42 percent believed that likelihood of 
devaluation is big or very big, 43.78 believed that the likelihood of devaluation is small 
or very small, 15.32 percent: that it is zero, and 4.48 percent did not give an answer.  
Before we continue with observations from the data, it is useful to formulate 
several hypotheses. The first hypothesis is that those who believe the currency board was 
responsible for the high unemployment are more likely to expect the currency board to be 
abandoned with a resulting large devaluation. If the currency board is perceived as 
causing unemployment and if the government wants to lower unemployment, then the 
solution is to abandon the currency board. As we discussed earlier, slow growth also 
contributes to long-term fiscal risks. 
The second hypothesis is that political affiliation influences the perceived 
likelihood of a policy change.  The government in 2000 was committed to maintaining 
the currency board. Those who support the government are more likely to believe this 
commitment than those in opposition. 
The third hypothesis is that the extent to which agents were informed about 
economic developments in 2000 had an influence on the perceived likelihood of a large 
devaluation. Respondents who were more informed about policy and economic 
developments may have greater concerns about the sustainability of the currency board 
given the high unemployment. 
The differences in expectations among various subgroups reported in Table 3 
generally support those propositions. The largest difference in expectations seems to exist 
between agents who have different perception of the effect of the currency board on 
unemployment. Those who believed that the currency board contributes to 
unemployment had heightened expectations of devaluation. Notice that those are almost 
half of the respondents (in fact about a third strongly agreed with that statement), similar 
to 2001 and 2002. Forty-four percent of them expected devaluation compared to 29.76 William Davidson Institute Working Paper 540 
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percent of those who did not believe that the currency board contributes to 
unemployment.  
As we expected, agents who followed economic news more closely also had 
heightened expectations of devaluation. Political affiliation also played an important role. 
Of the agents who supported the government, 23.12 expected devaluation compared to 
38.94 percent of agents who opposed the government. Notice, however, that the 
supporters of the government accounted for only 17 percent of the population (173 
respondents), which indicated that by the summer of 2000 the government had lost public 
support.  
Differences also existed along education and age lines. More educated agents 
were more likely to expect devaluation which is a similar but smaller effect compared to 
the difference observed between more and less informed agents. Older agents appeared to 
have greater confidence in the currency board.  
We later turn to a multivariate ordered probit estimation to examine the effects of 
those variables statistically. Before that, however, we should point out that with a longer 
forecast horizon (five years) we observe the same patterns of differences among groups 
without a clear indication that the size of the differences is greater or smaller. Also, in 
2001 and 2002, the differences between groups were similar. For example, in 2002, of 
those who believed that the currency board contributed to high unemployment (43 
percent of all agents), 27.15 percent expected devaluation. Of those who did not believe 
that the currency board contributed to unemployment, 14.29 percent expected 
devaluation. The overall credibility had improved but the difference between those two 
groups were similar: 27.86 – 14.29 = 12.86 percentage points in 2002 compared to 44.75 
– 29.76 = 14.99 percentage points in 2000.
15  
To undertake a multivariate analysis of the various effects on expectations, we 
start by creating a variable Expected Devaluation.
 16 The variable ranges from 1 to 5 
                                                 
15 Tables with the distribution of expectations in 2001 and 2002 as well as over various horizons are 
available on request.  
16 The same estimations were performed using the 2001 and 2002 surveys and similar results obtain. The 
2000 data are interesting because of the additional question about agent’s interests in economic affairs and 
the upcoming elections, which raised concerns about potential policy reversals. Estimates using the 2001 
and 2002 surveys are available on request.  William Davidson Institute Working Paper 540 
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where 1 stands for zero probability of devaluation in the next year and 5 stands for a 
“very big” probability of devaluation.  
Two explanatory variables are Unemployment_Agree  (UA) equal to 1 if an agent 
agreed or strongly agreed that the currency board leads to high unemployment, zero 
otherwise, and Unemployment_Disagree  (UD) equal to 1 if an agent disagreed or 
strongly disagreed that the currency board leads to high unemployment, zero otherwise. 
We expect UA to be positively related and UD to be negatively related to the perceived 
likelihood of a large devaluation. We created two variables in order to test for symmetry 
of the beliefs of those who agree and those who disagree with the statement. The third 
option is that an agent provided no answer.  
  Political affiliation is measured by a variable called Vote (V), which equals 1 if an 
agent votes for the party in office, the party that introduced the currency board, and zero 
otherwise.  We expect this variable to be negatively related to the perceived likelihood of 
a large devaluation. 
We created a variable Informed (I) equal to 1 if an agent reports following 
economic news closely, and zero otherwise. We expect that the variable (I) will be 
positively related to the likelihood of an expected large devaluation.  
To examine these hypotheses, we estimated an ordered probit model with 
Expected Devaluation as the dependent variable. The ordered probit procedure involves 
assigning a value v to each observation, in our case: 
  v = b1 UA + b2 UD + b3 V + b4 I    (1) 
Let u be a standard normal variable (with zero mean and variance of one). Define 
the probabilities: 
 Pr[Expected Devaluation = 1 | I, V, U] = Pr(v + u < k1) = Pr(u < k1 - v)   (2) 
 Pr[Expected Devaluation = i | I, V, U]  = Pr(ki-1 < v + u <  ki)  
               = Pr(ki-1 - v < u < ki - v), for i = 2,3,4  (3) 
 Pr[Expected Devaluation = 5 | I, V, U]  = Pr(k4 < v + u ) = Pr(k4 - v < u)   (4) 
  The ordered probit produces maximum likelihood estimates of the b coefficients 
and the four additional “cut-point” parameters k1 through k4. The estimated b coefficients 
indicate whether a certain characteristic of a respondent influences her/his perceived risk 
of devaluation upward or downward. These coefficients along with the cut-points k can William Davidson Institute Working Paper 540 
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be used to calculate the probability that an agent with particular characteristics would be 
in any one of the groups assigned by the values of Expected Devaluation. 
The results from estimating the ordered probit model are reported in Table 4. The 
results support what we observed in Table 3:   
(1) Those who associate the currency board with high unemployment are more likely to 
expect it to collapse.  However, those who state that the currency board is not a cause 
for unemployment are not less likely to expect devaluation, after taking other effects 
into account.  
(2) Those who politically opposed the government are more likely to expect the currency 
board to collapse in the next six months.  
(3) The more informed observers also have a greater expectation of devaluation.  
  We reran the regression adding demographic variables for education, gender and 
age. This had little effect on the coefficients b1 to b4. Older respondents tend to view the 
future of the currency board with more confidence. Perhaps older agents remember much 
better the period of socialism when the exchange rate had not changed for years while the 
younger generation has experienced mostly periods of stability taking turns with crises. It 
may therefore be more difficult for younger respondents to believe that sustained 
financial stability is possible. 
 
5.  Credibility and economic activity 
Has incomplete credibility affected economic performance? Theoretically, 
uncertainty about future inflation should raise long-term interest rates and produce a 
dampening effect on credit activity and investment. In Bulgaria, however, this effect is 
difficult to observe as financial assets seldom have long maturity which, of course, can 
also be attributed to excessive inflation uncertainty. Before we blame sluggish credit 
activity on low credibility however we should make several important observations.  
 First, there are numerous factors that explain the underdevelopment of the 
financial market in Bulgaria. Domestic credit to households and enterprises is still around 
15 percent of GDP (Berglof and Bolton, 2002). Distinguishing between good and bad 
risk is difficult in an environment where borrowers have little or no credit history and 
banks are still poorly equipped to evaluate projects. In addition, inefficient bankruptcy William Davidson Institute Working Paper 540 
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procedures force lenders to lend with great caution. The market for land and real estate, 
as well as the secondary markets for various technology items and machinery, is illiquid, 
which rules out their widespread usefulness as collateral. It is difficult to determine the 
extent to which credit activity is restrained by those institutional factors or by low 
credibility. Few of the transition economies have so far been very successful in 
developing their financial markets despite varying degrees of success in economic 
transition (Berglof and Bolton, 2002).  
Second, under the currency board, agents are free to convert local into foreign 
currency and to use foreign currency in many transactions. As the costs of doing business 
in foreign currencies are very small, currency substitution is prevalent. In 2000, fifty nine 
percent of deposits in the banking system and 84.7 percent of domestic credit to the 
private sector were in foreign currencies. Those numbers have not changed much 
throughout the currency board life and are very similar to earlier years. In fact they are 
very similar to the Argentine statistics. In June 2000, 63.3 percent of bank deposits in 
Argentina were in foreign currency similar to previous years.
17 In this environment, it is 
possible that incomplete credibility leads to de facto dollarization (euroization) and the 
use of foreign currencies in longer-term transactions rather than to transactions not being 
executed. With this, the output effect of incomplete credibility may not be as large as it 
would be if currency substitution were not allowed. The rising level of investment (Table 
1) can be suggestive of that, although it may also be a transitory phenomenon related to 
accelerated privatization and foreign direct investment.  
The results from the surveys suggest that although incomplete, the perceived 
likelihood of devaluation have been fairly stable. This is consistent with with recent 
research on money demand under the currency board (Savova, 2002) and with the stable 
proportion of foreign to local money in savings portfolios. This low sensitivity of 
expectations is important because, under the currency board, shifts in money demand can 
translate directly into interest-rate volatility. The relative stability also suggests that it is 
long-term issues such as growth and employment that have lasting influences on 
credibility. 
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6.  Final remarks  
We use unique survey data from Bulgaria to examine whether expectations of 
devaluation persisted after that country achieved low inflation under a currency board 
system and to examine the various influences on those expectations. The question is of 
interest since many theoretical models that explain the failure of stabilization programs 
assume lack of full credibility, yet the empirical evidence is very limited.  
There are a number of results reported in the paper but in broad terms, we can 
conclude that 1) credibility, particularly longer-term, remains incomplete despite years of 
low inflation and signs of economic revitalization; we would not have been able to 
observe that using economic variables as inflation and short term interest rates in 
Bulgaria declined rapidly and have remained low; it appears that, as in Mehlum (2001), 
credibility and output performance are jointly determined; 2) while political and external 
events have some role, credibility seems tied to more fundamental developments and 
therefore rapid gains are not likely; the persistent positive interest rate differentials 
observed in Argentina and Hong-Kong (Schmukler and Serven, 2001) give little hope 
that incomplete credibility would soon cease to be an issue in Bulgaria; and 3) there is 
substantial heterogeneity among agents in terms of their expectations although more 
research is needed to understand if such heterogeneity has important economic effects. 
There are a number of questions that this paper raises and that need to be 
examined further. First, our conjectures of the previous section that currency substitution 
may mitigate the negative consequences of credibility should be examined more 
systematically. The evidence here suggests that this is necessary as the low credibility 
observed in the surveys did indeed lead to persistent currency substitution. Second, future 
observations on expected devaluation in Bulgaria will reveal whether credibility 
improved with improvements in economic performance or the other way around. So far 
the results suggest that credibility is closely linked to economic performance and we 
suspect that output gains are necessary in order for credibility to improve. Third, future 
observations on expectations should reveal at what point (presuming steady improvement 
in credibility over time) would assets with longer maturity denominated in local currency 
start to be more common in the country. So far, after five years with low inflation, assets 
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still have short maturities. Fourth, there is much current interest in the effect of agent 
heterogeneity and segmented markets on economic activity. A further look at the data 
and economic developments in Bulgaria may be revealing in that area.  
Serious long-term problems continue to fuel devaluation concerns despite the 
success with disinflation. Apparently, even a currency board regime, which features 
complete backing of local money, full convertibility, and large political costs of 
devaluation and is set in a country with fairly positive prospects as a future member of 
the European Union cannot eliminate concerns. Having achieved disinflation is 
apparently not sufficient and stabilization is a process rather than an event.   
Despite similar credibility problems, Bulgaria has more fortunate circumstances 
compared to Argentina as Bulgaria is expected to join the euro zone. In this sense, the 
exit from the currency board is visible and clear and maintaining stable finances 
meanwhile is a priority. One has to wonder however why adoption of the euro needs to 
be delayed until then.   
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1992 79.2  -2.9  53.7    -7.3 15.3  0.0 
1993 63.9  -8.7  54.5    -1.5 16.4  0.0 
1994 121.9  -3.9  76.8  9.3  1.8 12.8  0.2 
1995 32.9  -5.7  39.3  14.6  2.1 11.1  0.5 
1996 310.8  -10.4  117.8  8.9  -10.1 12.5  0.8 
1997 578.6  -2.1  345.0  12.2  -7.0 13.7  3.2 
1998 1.0  0.9 11.5 11.6  3.5 12.2  1.7 
1999 6.2 -0.9 11.8 15.9  2.4 16.0  2.3 
2000 11.4  -1.1  28.8  16.3  5.8 17.9  1.3 
2001 10.4  -1.5  26.1  19.9  4.6 17.3  1.2 
Sources: European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Transition Report, various years; 
Bulgarian National Bank, Annual Report, various years. 









What is the likelihood that the currency board will collapse in the next 6 months, 
12 months, or 5 years with a sharp devaluation of the local currency?  
National surveys, Bulgaria, August 2000, October 2001, and June 2002. 
Percent of respondents by type of response. 
 
6 months  12 months  5 years 
 
08/00 10/01 06/02 08/00 10/01 06/02 08/00 10/01 06/02 
Very  big  12.3 5.5  4.6  12.4 4.7  6.7  13.3  7.4 9.9 
Big  19.0  9.7  10.9 24.0 14.4  11.9 25.7  22.3 16.3 
Small    29.7 28.3  28.5 28.7 31.6  29.9 30.4  29.3 27.6 
Very 
small  13.5 23.2  14.2 15.2 24.6  15.5 12.0  20.4 11.6 
None  20.6 30.7  26.7 15.3 21.7  20.5 12.9  16.8 17.7 
No 
answer  4.8    2.6 15.1 4.5 3.0 15.5 5.7  3.8  16.9 
Total 100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0 
 










Perceived risk of devaluation and respondent characteristics 
Bulgaria, August 2000  
 
What is the probability of 












All respondents (1004)  36.42 43.78  15.32  4.48 
With higher education (241) 



















Agents 45 years of age or older (450) 









Political supporters of current government (173) 









Agents who report following economic news closely (272) 









Currency board contributes to unemployment (476) 















Notes: The number of respondents in each category is in parentheses.  In some categorizations, the sum 
may not add to 1004, the total number of respondents because of no answers. 
aBeliefs about the effect of the currency board on unemployment are obtained from a survey question 
which asked respondents whether they strongly agreed, agreed, disagreed, or strongly disagreed with the 
statement that the currency board contributed to high unemployment. The strongly agree and agree answers 









Perceived risk of devaluation  
Bulgaria, August 2000 
 
 Dependent  variable: 
Perceived risk of devaluation 
over the next year 
 
Dependent variable: 
Perceived risk of devaluation 




























































Chi2 (7), Chi2 (4) 





Notes: Ordered probit. Standard errors in parentheses. ***(**,*) significant at the 1(5, 10) percent 
level. Perceived risk of devaluation is ordered from zero to very high. 
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